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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues to be determined are as follows:
1.

Was sufficient evidence introduced to support a finding

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
2.

Was inadmissible evidence introduced at trial, specifi-

cally an allegation that the defendant participated in the
exchange of narcotics substances?
3.

Should the trial court have given an accomplice instruc-

tion?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was charged with the offense of theft, a thirddegree felony.

The substance of the charge is that the defendant

did receive, retain or dispose of property of another knowing
that said property had been stolen.
The matter was heard before jury on the 27th day of November,
1984.

Pursuant to the jury's findings, the defendant was found

guilty of the offense and sentenced accordingly.

The state called three witnesses to support their information.

The first witness, Carl Johnson, was called on behalf of

the State of Utah, and he testified that on January 13, 1984 he
was the owner of one air compressor.

He testified that he woke

up one morning at approximately six o'clock and noticed immediately that his air compressor was missing (T. 6).
He further testified that he did not authorize the use or
possession of that air compressor by either Mr. Pierce or Michael
Adams (T. 6 ) .
He testified that he purchased the air compressor for the sum
of $307.00 in 1979.

He further testified that he received an

insurance reimbursement check in the sum of $275.00 (T. 8).
The property was allegedly taken on January 13, 1984 (T. 10).
Upon the property being returned to Mr. Johnson, Mr. Johnson
advised the court that approximately $103.00 worth of damages had
occurred to the compressor.

Said damages included the shroud

that covered the pulleys that were broken upon the said air
compressor and other minor things (T. 14).

Mr. Johnson also

further indicated that there was no attempt to remove or alter
serial numbers, paint the compressor different colors, or alter
it in any fashion or manner (T. 16 L. 5 ) .
The second witness called by the State of Utah was Michael
Adams.

Mr. Adams testified that he stole the property on the

13th of January from Carl Johnson.
(T. 19-20).

He was assisted by Mark Ward

Mr. Adams testified that subsequent to the time of

the theft, he contacted the defendant and the defendant agreed to
purchase it from Michael Adams (T. 21-22).

Mr. Adams, pursuant to the questioning of the prosecutor,
stated that he received compensation for the compressor.

The

prosecutor pursued the questioning of what payment was received
by Mr. Pierce.

Defense counsel objected and subsequently moved

the court to declare a mistrial.

The court, over objection,

allowed Mr. Adams to testify that he received a bag of marijuana
in exchange for the air compressor and that the bag of marijuana
was worth the sum of $100.00 (T. 24. L. 7-17).
Mr. Adams further testified that he attempted to reobtain
possession of the air compressor in May.

Mr. Pierce had

completed repairs upon the machine and demanded that he be paid
$180.00 to return the air compressor • (T. 26).
The next witness called by the state was Alex Hunt, a Deputy
Sheriff for Utah County, State of Utah.

The officer testified as

to the discussions between himself and Mr. Adams (T. 39-50).
Subsequent to the evidence being submitted by the prosecution, defense counsel motioned the court for a mistrial upon the
grounds that the defendant was charged with theft by receiving
and the state had introduced evidence of a separate crime or
possible crime, distribution of marijuana (T. 52-54).
Counsel also motioned the court to dismiss the information
against the defendant based upon the fact that the state had
failed to properly charge the date of the offense and that the
case had failed to meet the burden of proof regarding the value
of property being in excess of $250.00.

All motions were denied.

The defense called as its witnesses Mark Ward, Densil Harvey,
David Bunker, and the defendant, Richard Pierce.

Mark Ward testified that he assisted Michael Adams in obtaining the property from Carl Johnson on January 13, 1984 (T. 62).
Mr. Ward further testified that they approached Mr. Pierce for
the purchase of the air compressor.

Mr. Pierce asked where the

compressor came from and Mr. Ward and Mr. Adams advised Mr.
Pierce that it used to be Michael Adams' father's (T. 63 L. 12).
Mr. Ward advised the court that Mr. Pierce at no time was advised
that the property was stolen (T. 64 L. 6).

They advised Mr.

Pierce that they had the authority to sell it and the authority
to sell was from Michael Adams' father (T. 65 L. 14).
Densil Harvey was called as a witness on behalf of the
defense as to the value of the property.
David Bunker testified that he was an employee of Timp Rental
Agency in Orem, Utah (T. 86). He also testified as to value of
the compressor (T. 89).
The defendant testified (T. 93). He advised the court, in
conformance with Mr. Ward's testimony, that he had no idea or
belief that the compressor was stolen (T. 94 L. 22-23).

Mr.

Pierce testified that he was not in possession of the compressor
at the time Mr. Adams requested the compressor be returned but
that in fact Mr. Pierce had sold it to another person for the sum
of $180.00 and needed to be paid back the sum of $180.00 before
he could retrieve the same.
The state recalled as a rebuttal witness Steve Palont.
state further called Sidney Paskett.
to the value of the compressor.

The

Both witnesses testified as

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The state's case rests upon the credibility attached to

three witnesses:

Michael Adams, Mark Ward and Richard Pierce.

Michael Adams was the thief who stole the property and acted as
an accomplice to this alleged crime.

Two witnesses were called

to contradict the testimony of Michael Adams:
Richard Pierce.

Mark Ward and

Richard Pierce and Mark Ward raised such a

reasonable doubt as to the testimony of Michael Adams to warrant
setting aside the verdict of guilty.
II.

The state's case rests upon the testimony of an accom-

plice, Michael Adams.

The court failed to instruct the jury

regarding accomplice testimony, and the court was so required by
the provisions of 77-17-7, U.C.A.
III.

The state improperly admitted evidence of the defendant

dealing in marijuana.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GUILT
Defendant submits, as a matter of law, that the jury verdict
was not supported by sufficient facts to justify the verdict of
guilt.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled upon whether a jury verdict
may be set aside.

In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977),

the court stated as follows:
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to sustain his conviction, it must appear
that viewing the evidence and all inferences that may be
reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the

verdict of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To set aside a verdict, it
must appear that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.
In the present case, the state's evidence was based upon the
testimony of Michael Adams, the principal thief in the taking of
property from Carl Johnson on January 13, 1984.

No other

evidence establishes possession nor the mental state of mind
requisite for the conviction.

The testimony of Carl Johnson

fails to implicate the defendant in any crime, nor does the
testimony of Officer Alex Hunt.

The sole supporting indictment

against the defendant is made by Michael Adams.
The defendant, in his testimony, denied the allegations and
specifically told the court that he did not know that the
property had been stolen or that it had probably been stolen.
In support of defendant's petition, he also called Mark Ward.
Mr. Ward was the accomplice of Michael Adams in the theft of the
property from Carl Johnson on January 13.

Mr. Ward testified

that he approached Mr. Pierce to purchase the air compressor.
Mr. Pierce was advised by Mr. Adams and Mr. Ward that the
property had not been stolen but in fact the property belonged to
Mr. Adams' father.
The evidence incriminating the defendant that was submitted
by the state was tainted by its source, the thief of the
property.

Such evidence was contradicted by the defendant and

further by Mr. Adams' accomplice, Mark Ward.

Defendant submits

that such evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to
support the conviction.

POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN
THE ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION
Under current law, a conviction may be had on uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.
viewed with caution.

However, such testimony should be

Section 77-17-7, Utah Code Annotated,

provides as follows:
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the
jury may be given to the effect that such uncorroborated
testimony should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.
In the present case, Michael Adams was an accomplice to the
allegation of theft against the defendant [see State v. Taylor,
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977) wherein Utah's theft statute consolidated offenses of larceny and receiving stolen property into a
single offense of theft].
Section 76-2-202 defines an accomplice as follows:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense, who directly commits the offense,
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.
The sole incriminating evidence offered at trial against the
defendant was the testimony of accomplice Adams.

In direct

opposition to said testimony, the defendant offered his testimony
as well as the testimony of accomplice Ward.

Such testimony is

certainly suspect, uncertain or improbable.
The jury should have been instructed that the uncorroborated

testimony of an accomplice should be viewed with extreme caution.
The court should have entered a finding that the testimony of the
accomplice was uncertain and/or improbable and thereby given the
instruction to the jury [see §77-17-7(2), U.C.A., supra].
instruction was given to the jury.

No

No findings were made.

In People v. Baker (1982), 110 111. App. 3d 1015, 66 111.
Dec. 587, 443 N.E.2d 270, the Supreme Court of the State of
Illinois reversed the conviction of a defendant where the trial
court refused to give instructions cautioning the jury that an
accomplice testimony was .subject to suspicion.
In the instant case, the court failed to provide the instruction and the conviction should be reversed.

The court was

required by the provisions of Section 77-17-7(2) to make appropriate findings and submit the cautionary accomplice instruction.
POINT III
THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in paragraph
(b) as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
In the present case, the defendant was charged with the
offense of theft by receiving, in that he received, retained, or
disposed of property of another knowing it had been stolen or
believing that it probably had been stolen with the purpose to
deprive the owner thereof.

The evidence admitted by the state

that the defendant paid to Michael Adams $100.00 worth of
marijuana was irrelevant to the issues before the court.
Rule 401 of the Rules of Evidence defines relevancy as
follows:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Even in the case where evidence may be argued to be relevant,
evidence should be excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, misleading the jury or other considerations.

See

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
In the present situation, the evidence of distribution of
marijuana had no relevance to the issues of guilt or innocence of
the charge of theft, but was introduced solely to indict the
defendant as a person dealing in marijuana.
In State v. Saunders, 7 U.A.R. 19, 699 P.2d 738 (1985), this
court reviewed the case of a defendant who had been convicted of
burglary, theft and possession of a firearm by a restricted
person and in addition, a habitual criminal charge.

The defen-

dant had been accused of offenses in connection with an April
1982 incident in which a home in Sandy, Utah was broken into and
various property, including firearms, were stolen.
Before trial, the defense counsel moved to sever the firearm
count from the remaining charge.

The motion was denied, thereby

allowing the state to introduce evidence of other crimes by route
of the charge of "possession of a firearm by a restricted

9

person."

Trial on the burglary, theft and firearms counts

proceeded before a jury.
The primary evidence against the defendant was a testimony of
Stacy Williams, who was granted immunity in exchange for his
testimony.

Williams testified that he and the defendant broke

into the home and took the property.
testify.

The defendant did not

However, the defendant did stipulate that at the time

of the alleged offenses he was an inmate at the Utah State
Prison, housed in a halfway house.

The jury convicted the defen-

dant of burglary, theft, and possession of a firearm by a
restricted person.

The defendant was then tried by the court on

the habitual criminal charge.
The court held that by denying defendant's motion to sever,
the trial court allowed the jury to consider evidence of the
defendant's prior crime as a basis for an inference that he
committed the burglary and theft; an inference the rules are
intended to prevent.
Rule 55 of the former Rules of Evidence governing the case
provided:
Evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a
specified occasion is inadmissible to prove his disposition
to commit a crime or civil wrong as a basis for an inference
that he committed another crime or civil wrong on another
separate occasion, but . . . such evidence is admissible when
relevant to prove some other material fact . . .
The court concluded that the evidence that the defendant was
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison was not admissible
evidence, not relevant thereby, to the charges of burglary and
theft.

10

In the present situation, evidence of the defendant's payment
to the state witness Michael Adams of marijuana for the compressor was inadmissible.

The only inference this evidence had was

to show a criminal disposition as the basis for the undue inference that he was guilty of the charge of theft by receiving.
CONCLUSION
This case represents a conviction based upon the credibility
attached to three witnesses:

Michael Adams, Mark Ward, and

Richard Pierce.
The testimony of Michael Adams should be viewed with caution.
The jury should have been so advised.
The state's case balanced solely upon the believability of
Mr. Adams.

When so viewed, the testimony of a marijuana exchange

even further heightens the potential for undue prejudice and
aggravates the potential for improper conviction.

The jury was

asked to believe a thief, or the testimony of an accomplice and
the defendant, who the jury was told also sells marijuana.

The

potential for undue prejudice and inferences exists and the
evidence should have been excluded.
DATED this

&C7 day of February, 1986.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
to David L. Wilkinson, Utah State Attorney General, Attorney for
Plaintiff/Respondent, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this cK^
day of February, 1986.

